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Empirical findings on public goods dilemmas indicate an unresolved dilemma: that increasing size—the number of people in the dilemma—sometimes increases, decreases, or does
not influence cooperation. We clarify this dilemma by first classifying public goods dilemma
properties that specify individual outcomes as individual properties (e.g., Marginal Per Capita Return) and group outcomes as group properties (e.g., public good multiplier), mathematically showing how only one set of properties can remain constant as the dilemma size
increases. Underpinning decision-making regarding individual and group properties, we
propose that individuals are motivated by both individual and group preferences based on a
theory of collective rationality. We use Van Lange's integrated model of social value orientations to operationalize these preferences as an amalgamation of outcomes for self, outcomes for others, and equality of outcomes. Based on this model, we then predict how the
public good's benefit and size, combined with controlling individual versus group properties,
produce different levels of cooperation in public goods dilemmas. A two (low vs. high benefit) by three (2-person baseline vs. 5-person holding constant individual properties vs. 5-person holding constant group properties) factorial experiment (group n = 99; participant n =
390) confirms our hypotheses. The results indicate that when holding constant group properties, size decreases cooperation. Yet when holding constant individual properties, size increases cooperation when benefit is low and does not affect cooperation when benefit is
high. Using agent-based simulations of individual and group preferences vis-à-vis the integrative model, we fit a weighted simulation model to the empirical data. This fitted model is
sufficient to reproduce the empirical results, but only when both individual (self-interest) and
group (other-interest and equality) preference are included. Our research contributes to understanding how people's motivations and behaviors within public goods dilemmas interact
with the properties of the dilemma to lead to collective outcomes.
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Introduction
Many human endeavors are neither accomplished nor enjoyed individually, but often people
come together and voluntarily cooperate to produce a public good that benefits more than the
individual. These include a range of large- and small-scale projects such as protecting the environment, electing officials, building libraries, parks, and infrastructure, maintaining charitable
organizations, producing collaborative research, keeping a clean house, and competing in a
multiplayer game or sport. Individuals often find themselves in a social dilemma with regard to
public goods in that they would like to enjoy the benefits of the public good (e.g., a clean environment or a clean house), but contributing to it costs them resources such as time, money,
and effort. Social dilemma situations form when individuals receive better outcomes for not
contributing compared to contributing regardless of what others do, yet all individuals receive
worse outcomes if no one contributes compared to everyone contributing [1]. Public goods dilemmas are a type of social dilemma where all can benefit from a collective resource, a public
good, regardless of who contributed to it [2]. Therefore, contributing to the public good (cooperating) is never as personally beneficial to one’s own outcomes; however, not contributing (defecting), while personally yielding more individual benefit, leads to less collective benefit [2, 3].
A fundamental feature of public goods dilemmas is the number of people involved, which
can range from two (e.g., household) to billions (e.g., environment). This difference in size can
alter the level of cooperation; however how it is altered is an unresolved dilemma as different
empirical studies indicate either positive, negative, or no effects, as we review later. Explanations of size effects in public goods games generally fall into two categories. One category
draws on the incentive or payoff structure, that is characteristics of the dilemma [4–6], whereas
the other category draws on other social psychological factors such as self-efficacy [7], normenforcement [8], monitoring [9], punishment [10] and framing [11]. We explore the both
types of explanations for the effect of size, proposing that, psychologically, people may reason
from both an individual and group perspective and that this reasoning clarifies why different
payoff structures have produced the size dilemma.
Because individual and group actions are interrelated in public goods dilemmas, a person
can conceptualize decision-making, behavior, and outcomes from an individual or group perspective, i.e., in terms of the dilemma’s properties applied to the individual or group. Whereas
the individual actor’s perspective is a traditional foundation for theorizing [12, 13], recent
work suggests that people also reason at a group or team level, often referred to as collective rationality [14–17]. Herein, we use Van Lange’s integrative model of social value orientations
[18] which accounts for individual and group perspectives [14] by integrating preferences for
self, others, and equality into one weighted model of decision-making.
A number of researchers have investigated group size in public goods dilemmas [4, 5, 19,
20], but, we argue, that an implicit assumption about an individual or group perspective was
embedded in their implementation of the public goods dilemma leading to the range of empirical results. Therefore, we extend Van Lange’s integrative model to public goods dilemmas,
demonstrating how the simultaneous consideration of individual and group perspectives can
clarify this size dilemma. We show that the divergent specifications used within other studies
can be simplified to varying differences in overall benefit—that is the value of cooperating—
and that this benefit changes with size based on properties affiliated with either an individual
or group perspective. We conduct an experiment which crosses low or high benefit with the
type of property held constant as size increases, confirming the different relationships between
size and cooperation found in previous research. Then, to show that the integrative model can
reproduce the empirical results across the different property specifications, we use an agentbased simulation with agents that combined individual and group preferences to determine
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their behavior. Whereas matching the empirical results shows that the integrative model is sufficient to account for the different specifications, the parameter estimation also is suggestive of
how individuals might integrate individual and group perspectives.

The Multiplayer Public Goods Dilemma
A voluntary linear multiple-player public goods dilemma differs from common resource dilemmas and step-function public goods dilemmas in several important ways. Public goods dilemmas focus on people pooling resources or effort to provide a good for all, whereas common
resource dilemmas relate to taking resources from a common pool. For linear public goods dilemmas every contribution creates additional benefit, whereas step-function public goods dilemmas the public good is provided only if a particular step threshold is obtained. Example of
step-function dilemmas include fund-raising to build a new library or a certain number of people needed to serve on a committee [21], whereas examples of linear public goods include the
environment, a clean house, a potluck dinner, or reviews on a website such that additional contributions continue to increase the benefit of that good for everyone.
We defined a linear public goods dilemma such that the dilemma’s participants have a binary choice to contribute (cooperate) or not contribute (defect) each round over multiple rounds
of interaction. For each round, an individual’s outcome is defined by the following:
8 cza
>
if cs ¼ 1 ðcontributesÞ
<
n
ð1Þ
outcome ¼
>
: cza þ z if cs ¼ 0 ðdoes not contributeÞ
n
where n is the number of total participants (size), c is the total number of contributors (cs is 1 if
self contributes; cO is number of others who contribute, such that c = cs +co), z is each participant’s endowment, and α is the dilemma multiplier. Explained discursively, each renewed endowment of z that is contributed to the group is multiplied by α, then divided among the
group members n regardless of who contributed, whereas any endowment z not contributed is
kept towards one’s own outcome. Breaking down the effects based on what a participant can
control, on any given round the portion that participants receive from their own decision is za
n
for contributing (if cS = 1 then c is 1 greater) or z for not contributing (cS = 0). Therefore, a participant’s temptation to defect [5], the proﬁt one will earn by not contributing, is z  za
n . Furza
thermore, participants earn n per additional group member, cO, that contributes, meaning a
potential earnings for full cooperation is zα when c = n. The value za
n must always remain less
than z to be classiﬁed as a public goods dilemma; otherwise one’s payout would be largest by always contributing to the public good. Consequently, the multiplier is constrained to 1  α < n.
For an illustration, suppose z = 100, α = 1.6, and n = 2. Then the outcome a participant will
earn each round would be 160 if both contribute (cS = 1; cO = 1), 100 if neither contribute (cS =
0; cO = 0), 180 if only the other player contributes (cS = 0; cO = 1), or 80 if only the participant
contributes (cS = 1; cO = 0).

Properties that Vary with Group Size
A central issue for investigating group size in voluntary public goods dilemmas involves two
types of properties from the dilemma that vary differently with the group size. The first type relates to the entire group’s calculus or outcomes for the social dilemma, such as the dilemma’s
multiplier or the earning potential if all participants cooperate. These group properties represent the group-focused aspects of the dilemma, addressing the question: what is most beneficial
for the entire group? Therefore an actor with only a group perspective would interpret the
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Table 1. Four properties of voluntary public goods dilemmas.
Properties without Endowment
Group Properties

Dilemma Multiplier

Individual Properties

Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR)

Properties with Endowment
α
a
n

Earnings for Full Cooperation

zα

Temptation to Defect

z—zna

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120379.t001

dilemma in terms of these group properties. The second type of property relates to the individual participants’ reward calculus and outcomes, such as their temptation to defect or marginal
za
per capita return (MPCR). The MPCR, za
n , is a ratio of the individuals’ marginal benefit, n , to
the individuals’ marginal cost, z, for contributing. These individual properties remain structured by the overall specification of the public goods dilemma, but are psychologically understood from the vantage of one individual asking the question: what is most beneficial for me?
Therefore, an actor with only an individual perspective would interpret the dilemma using
these individual properties.
It is critical to note that either the group or individual properties can be held constant as the
dilemma size increases, but not both. The multiplier, α, and earning potential for full cooperation, zα, do not contain the group size variable n. In contrast, the marginal per capita return, na,
and the temptation to defect, z  za
n , both vary based on the group size. Examining the formulas for these different properties, we see the simplest group and individual properties are the
multiplier and the MPCR because they exclude the endowment. Whereas the endowment is
important for baseline levels of cooperation behavior, if it is held constant it is not essential for
a comparison of how group and individual properties differ by dilemma size (see Table 1).
Note that MPCR ¼ na and therefore the individual property MPCR decreases with size if the
multiplier, a group property, is held constant. However, the same equation rewritten as α =
MPCR  n shows that group properties such as the multiplier α increase with size when the
MPCR, an individual property, is held constant (see Fig. 1 for their relationship and S1 Fig. and
S2 Fig. for a comparison of the multiplier and MPCR).

Individual and Group Perspectives and Properties
Whereas it is often assumed that people reason from an individual perspective to increase their
individual gain or decrease their individual loss, contemporary theorizing suggests that people
also reason from a team or collective viewpoint, namely, act to increase the collective gain, to
decrease the collective loss, or to increase equality [14, 15, 17]. Colman et al. [15] suggests that
collective rationality, that is a rationality that occurs individually but includes reasoning about
a team or group, is fundamental in many decision making contexts. Applying it to game theory
and vignettes, they find that collective rationality predicts a large percentage of individual’s decisions, in some cases better than an individual rationality, or self-interest.
In a similar vein, Van Lange [22] has proposed an integrative model of social value orientations whereby prosocially oriented individuals attempt to not only jointly maximize their own
and other’s outcomes, but also the equality of outcomes as shown in Equation 2.
Utility ¼ W1 ðOutcomes for Self Þ þ W2 ðOutcomes for OtherÞ þ W3 ðEquality in outcomesÞð2Þ
This model was supported empirically in prosocials’ decision making [22]. Because Coleman
et al.’s standard for collective rationality was maximizing joint beneﬁt [16], Van Lange [14]
showed that this integrative model can account for the ﬁndings of Colman et al.’s collective rationality. Joint beneﬁt is simply an equal focus on the outcomes to self and others, or applying
W1 = W2 = .5 and W3 = 0 to the integrative model equation. Therefore, we note that the
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Fig 1. The relationship of the multiplier and MPCR for different sized groups, holding constant the multiplier at 1.2 and 1.6 or holding constant the
MPCR at 0.6 and 0.8. The dark lines are for N = 2 and N = 5, and lighter lines are for N = 3, N = 4, N = 6, and N = 8. Circle endpoints indicate the six
conditions parameters for this study.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120379.g001

integrative model represents collective rationality in terms of maximum joint beneﬁt and extends it to include other group-based preferences, namely equality. Equality is an important
factor for considering collective rationality because of its presence in social value orientations
[22] and as an explanation for group behavior [23].
Using the integrative model to capture both individual and group preferences, we reason
about how its different components could alter behavior in public goods dilemmas that vary
on size and individual or group properties. In public goods dilemmas the best Outcomes for Self
is always produced by defecting, however the strength of this varies based on the dilemma’s individual properties. A higher Marginal Per Capita Return, for example, means that cooperative
behavior returns a larger proportion of the contribution, thereby mitigating the appeal of defection. Conversely, the Outcomes for Others (which we pluralize to account for multiple other
participants) is always maximized by contributing in a public goods dilemma, yet the strength
of this also varies based on individual properties of the dilemma. The greater the MPCR, the
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more others benefit from a participant’s cooperation. Whereas maximizing outcomes for oneself versus others evoke opposite strategies (e.g., cooperation or defection), a higher MPCR enhances the utility of cooperation in both cases. Therefore, because MPCR decreases with size
when group properties are held constant, we expect (H1) cooperation should decrease with
group size if the group properties are held constant, yet (H2) cooperation should not change
with group size if the individual properties are held constant.
Maximizing equality in outcomes suggests a preference for full cooperation or full defection
as these produce the same—that is equal—outcomes for everyone. For a 2-person group, an individual’s decision always alters the Equality of Outcomes because matching the other participant’s choice with cooperation or defection produces full equality and opposing it produces
maximum inequality (i.e., the outcomes of one defector and one cooperator). For a larger
group, say five people, a participant’s decision to cooperate or defect has different effects on
equality outcomes depending on the decisions of others, as we later mathematically demonstrate. If two players cooperate and the other two defect, the inequality of the outcomes cannot
be reduced by either cooperation or defection (i.e., either there will be two cooperators and
three defectors, or vice versa). However, if four players cooperate, then cooperation produces
fully equal outcomes whereas defection produces less equal outcomes. This line of reasoning
leads to the counterintuitive conclusion that pursuing equality among outcomes can lead to polarized collective decisions. It also indicates that that equality will have a stronger polarization
effect for smaller groups and weaker polarization effect for larger groups.
Whether equality concerns will push a group towards full defection or full cooperation depend on the base levels of cooperation. In groups where there is a higher benefit from the public good, the equality of outcomes will be more likely to promote cooperation, whereas in
groups with a lower benefit from the public good the equality of outcomes will be more likely
to promote defection. Therefore, we expect (H3) cooperation levels should differ between levels
of benefit and be most pronounced in the 2-person groups. As we will see next, the empirical
findings appear to be consistent with these theoretical hypotheses.

Previous Research on Properties and Group Size
The literature on linear public goods dilemmas has found that size can increase [4, 6] or decrease [20, 24, 25] cooperation, sometimes depending on the condition [5, 26]. Field study data
has also shown under different conditions group size increase [27, 28] or does not influence
[29] contributions and cooperation. Because of the variation in results, a meta-analysis of linear
public goods studies found that size did not have a statistically significant impact on contributions [30].
Nonetheless, when group properties are held constant, cooperation decreases with group
size. For example, Yamagishi [20] compared group sizes ranging from 2 to 501 while holding
the multiplier constant in three experiments. He found that as group size increased, cooperation levels decreased, however this pattern was primarily for groups of smaller sizes below 10.
This supports our first hypothesis that cooperation should decrease with group size when
group properties are held constant, as well as our third hypothesis that cooperation levels
should be most pronounced in smaller size groups.
There is also evidence that when the individual properties are held constant, cooperation increases or does not change with group size. For example, Isaac and Walker [4] compared
group sizes of 4 and 10 and held constant the MPCR at .30 or .75. They altered initial endowments by condition so that the complete cooperation earning potential remained constant.
They found that when the MPCR was high, size had little effect on cooperation; however cooperation increased with group size when the MPCR was lower. Their conclusion was that at
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high MPCR, group size no longer matters as it does at low levels. A later study [31] compared
groups of size 4 to 100 making a similar conclusion, that at high levels of MPCR, size did not
alter cooperation, whereas it did at lower levels of MPCR. Other research [6] supports this position by finding that even differences in extremely low levels of MPCR can alter cooperation in
large groups (60 and 100).
Isaac and colleagues interpret their results as cooperation increasing with size at low benefit,
but they can be reasonably reinterpreted as cooperation increasing with benefit at small sizes.
Similarly, they conclude that under conditions of greater benefit, size does not alter cooperation, which can be reasonably reinterpreted as under conditions of greater size, benefit does
not alter cooperation. Therefore, the pattern of findings of this literature dovetails with both
our second and third hypothesis. The compatibility of this previous research with our predictions gives support to our argument about connecting individual and group preference with individual and group properties through the integrative model; however none of these
experiments examined group size while holding constant each type of property.

Experiment
We conduct an experiment according to our earlier dilemma specifications crossing group size
while either holding individual or group properties constant with high or low public goods
benefit. We hold the endowment z constant at 100 points for all conditions. We consider the
difference between group and individual properties by keeping either the multiplier or MPCR
constant as the group size increases (Fig. 1). We create two baseline experimental conditions
where the group size is 2. Based on previous literature, one has lower public goods benefit with
a multiplier of 1.2 and a MPCR of .60 and the second has a higher benefit with a multiplier of
1.6 and a MPCR of .80. From each of these baseline conditions we create comparison conditions by increasing the group size to 5 either holding the multiplier or the MPCR constant (see
Table 2). This research was approved by the Department Human Ethics Advisory Group, Melbourne School of Psychological Sciences, University of Melbourne (#1340741). All participants
read a plain language statement detailing the research and checked a consent box as written
consent before being allowed to participate.

Participants
US participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk (mturk.com) chose to participate in our study
for financial compensation (2.50 USD plus a bonus of approximately 1.00 to 4.00 USD based
on points earned). They were then directed to a web-based program especially designed for
this research. The instructions explained to participants their two choices of “keeping” (defecting) or “contributing” (cooperating) their endowment of 100 points each round. The program
presented a table with the number of points they would earn based on their own contribution
choice and others’ contribution choices. This table of point outcomes differed based on the
Table 2. Experimental Conditions.
2-Person

5-Person
Multiplier Constant

MPCR Constant

Multiplier = 1.2

Multiplier = 3.0

Lower Beneﬁt

Multiplier = 1.2
MPCR = .60

MPCR = .24

MPCR = .60

Higher Beneﬁt

Multiplier = 1.6

Multiplier = 1.6

Multiplier = 4.0

MPCR = .80

MPCR = .32

MPCR = .80

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120379.t002
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participants’ condition, but was displayed each time the participants selected a choice. Additionally, details about how the table was derived from the public goods dilemma multiplier and
the multiplier itself were also presented. To ensure adequate understanding, participants had
to correctly answer quiz questions about a table of point outcomes before playing the game.
Participants were assigned to a dilemma group and completed 31 rounds with that group.
After all group members made a selection each round, a feedback screen would indicate to
each participant their choice, their groups’ total choices (e.g., number who contributed and
number who kept their endowment), and the points they earned. No information was presented from previous rounds except the participant’s personal cumulative point total. Participants had no information about the others they were interacting with except the total number
who contributed or kept the endowment each round. Additional measurements were collected
before and after the dilemma.
To ensure that participants could not be held up indefinitely by others in their group, there
was a time limit for each round. If a selection was not submitted within that time the program
selected contribute for that participant. Participants who failed to select a choice on any three
rounds were timed out of the program and we excluded that entire group from our dataset. We
continued collecting data until we had at least 15 groups per condition where no participants
timed out of the program (99 groups with 390 participants).

Results
Excluded Data
Programmed responses accounted for 21 (0.2%) of the responses, but no group had more than
the individual’s maximum of two programmed responses in total. Even though programmed
responses were always cooperative, there is no indication they had a substantial or systematic
impact on our results (see S1 File for further explanation and analysis). Programmed responses
are excluded for all analyses. Because the data can be analyzed at multiple levels, we first examine data with groups as the unit of analysis to present an overall picture and simple statistics.
Then we examine data with the individual as the unit of analysis using more complex statistics
to control for the group-level interdependence. The group-level analyses based on 99 groups
do not have the statistical power of the individual analyses based on 390 participants and therefore the group-level analyses are overly conservative.

Group-Level Analyses
For group-level analyses, cooperation for each group was calculated as the average cooperative
decisions across all rounds for all individuals in the group. The two-person public goods groups
produced different levels of cooperation based on the benefit level. The lower benefit condition
(α = 1.2; MPCR = .60) led to less cooperation (.354), whereas the higher benefit conditions (α =
1.6; MPCR = .80) led to greater cooperation (.629; Means in Table 3), t(33) = -2.04, p = .050.
Additionally, neither condition produced near complete cooperation or defection, thereby allowing an increase in size to either increase or decrease cooperation.
Both five-person lower benefit conditions matched the two-person by either holding constant the multiplier or the MPCR (Fig. 2). When the multiplier was held constant the mean cooperation decreased from .354 to .162, which was marginally significant, t(20.11) = −1.94, p =
.066 (equal variances not assumed), whereas when the MPCR was held constant the mean cooperation significantly increased from .354 to .602, t(28.83) = 2.19, p = .037, equal variances
not assumed. Furthermore, the multiplier-constant condition produced more cooperation
than the MPCR-constant condition, t(21.16) = -6.40, p  .001, equal variances not assumed.
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Table 3. Counts and group cooperation means by condition.
2-Person

Lower Beneﬁt
Higher Beneﬁt

5-Person
Multiplier Constant

MPCR Constant

ng = 17; ni = 85

ng = 16; ni = 80

Counts

ng = 18; ni = 36

Group Cooperation

.354 (.402)

.162 (.119)

.602 (.251)

Counts

ng = 17; ni = 34

ng = 16; ni = 80

ng = 15; ni = 75

Group Cooperation

.629 (.397)

.237 (.161)

.611 (.206)

Note: ng is the number of groups; ni is the number of individuals. Standard deviation in parentheses.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120379.t003

The same comparisons were made for the higher benefit conditions. Holding the multiplier
constant when increasing the size from two to five people led to cooperation decreasing from
.629 to .237, t(21.36) = −3.76, p  .001 (equal variances not assumed), whereas holding the
MPCR constant led to no significant change in cooperation levels from .629 to .611, t(24.63) =
−.17, p = .866, equal variances not assumed. The multiplier-constant condition also had greater
cooperation than the MPCR-constant condition, t(29) = −5.65, p  .001.
To examine the overall effects of condition, we created dummy variables for the benefit level
(low or high), and the multiplier-constant conditions and the MPCR-constant conditions
(with 2-person groups as the reference). When conducting an ANOVA with the dummy variables and an intercept, all three dummy variables were significant (Table 4: Model 1; all p’s 
.05) such that high benefit increased cooperation, holding the multiplier constant size negatively affects cooperation, and holding the MPCR constant size positively affects cooperation.
When including the interaction effects in the model (Model 2), the multiplier-constant
dummy still decreases cooperation (H1), but the other two dummy variables no longer influence cooperation (H2). There is a marginally significant effect, F(1,93) = 3.67, p = .059, for Benefit X MPCR-constant interaction, suggesting that at low-benefit constant MPCR, size
positively affects cooperation; however at higher levels of benefit this increase is no longer

Fig 2. Group cooperation by conditions for 2-Person groups and 5-Person groups where either the Multiplier or MPCR was held constant (with
95% confidence intervals).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120379.g002
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Table 4. ANOVA predicting group cooperation by benefit level and size\type.
Model 1

Model 2

F(1, 95)

p

F(1, 93)

p

High Beneﬁt Level

4.744

.032

.350

.555

Multiplier Constant (5-p)a

17.448

.000

18.167

.000

2.845

.032

a

2.710

.103

High Beneﬁt X Multiplier Constant

2.125

.148

High Beneﬁt X MPCR Constant

3.668

.059

MPCR Constant (5-p)

a

2-Person groups are reference

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120379.t004

present (H3). To determine if these tendencies hold for a more rigorous higher power analysis,
we now turn to analyzing the data by individual.

Individual-Level Analyses
Individual cooperation was calculated as each participant’s average cooperation over all
rounds. When analyzing data at the individual level it is important to control for the interdependence between individuals as individuals in the same group can affect each other’s cooperation rates over time. Specifically, the interclass correlation rate is .6336, suggesting that over
half of the individual variance in cooperation is explained by group-level parameters (which in
this case includes the conditions as groups always functioned within a set of condition
parameters).
We conducted mixed models analyses that included group intercepts as a random effect covariant parameter with the design factors as fixed effects. The null model (Table 5: Model 1) indicates the statistical significance of the groups’ intercepts (.091, Std Error = .0156), Wald Z =
5.819, p  .001, and baseline fit statistics. Adding in the condition dummy variables (Model 2),
Table 5. Mixed models predicting individual cooperation by group membership, benefit level, and size\type.
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Estimate

F/Ward Zb

p

Estimate

F/Ward Zb

p

Estimate

F/Ward Zb

.425

168.516

.000

p

Fixed Effects
Intercept

.376

159.085

.000

.354

162.445

.000

High Beneﬁt Level

.114

4.546

.036

.275

.473

.511

Multiplier Constant (5p)a

−.289

19.378

.000

−.192

20.229

.000

MPCR Constant (5p) a

.119

3.170

.078

.248

3.028

.085

High Beneﬁt X Multiplier Constant

−.200

2.366

.128

High Beneﬁt X MPCR Constant

−.267

4.099

.046

Random Effects
Groups’ Intercepts (Covariance)

.0908

5.819

.000

.0549

4.945

.000

.0532

4.853

.000

Residual

.0525

11.976

.000

.0533

11.792

.000

.0533

11.794

.000

Information Criteria
−2 Restricted Log Likelihood

159.051

131.927

132.352

Schwarz’s Bayesian Criteria (BIC)

170.978

143.839

144.254

a
b

2-Person groups are reference
F statistics are used for ﬁxed effects and Ward Z statistics are used for random effects

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120379.t005
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we find similar patterns to our group-level analysis (H1) except that the MPCR-constant
dummy variable is only marginally significant (.119) F = 3.170, p = .078, and remains so in
Model 3 (H2). Adding the interaction effects in Model 3, this analysis show the interaction of
High Benefit X MPCR-Constant conditions has a negative and significant effect on cooperation
(-2.67) F = 4.099, p = .046. We interpret this to mean that when MPCR is held constant, benefit
has a stronger influence on cooperation between 2-person dilemmas than between 5-person dilemmas (H3). Thus, the interaction effect of our third hypothesis qualifies the simple effect of
MPCR-constant size changes on cooperation, our second hypothesis.

Discussion
Overall, we found some support for all three hypotheses, with the marginal support of the second hypothesis in the individual analyses being due primarily to its qualification by the third
hypothesis. Most notably our results were in line with previous studies. First, for the 2 person
public goods dilemmas the benefit level was the major predictor of cooperation levels. Consistent with prior work, increased size either promoted more, less, or the same amount of cooperation depending on whether group or individual properties were held constant and benefit
level [4, 5, 20]. This interaction between size and benefit dovetails with previous studies that
have found at high levels of MPCR group size no longer has discernible influence on cooperation [31]. This was also our surprising and counterintuitive prediction based on reasoning
about the dilemma’s properties and the group-preference of equality from the integrated
model of social orientations. We now turn to agent-based modeling to further explore whether
the group and individual preferences of the integrated model are able to be fit to these
empirical results.

Simulation using a Model of Individual and Group Preferences
We conduct a simulation of agents that uses Van Lange’s [14, 22] integrative model (Equation 2)
to show that the pattern of our cooperation results, which accounts for the size dilemma, can be
produced using this implementation of individual and group preferences without the need of additional complex assumptions about individual actors. In the integrative model’s weights (W)
allow it to be reduced to individual preferences such as self-interest (W1 = 1, W2 = 0, W3 = 0),
group preferences such as altruism (W1 = 0, W2 = 1, W3 = 0), and combined preferences such as
cooperation (W1 = .5, W2 = .5, W3 = 0) or egalitarianism (W1 = .5, W2 = 0, W3 = .5). Any set of
estimated weight parameters that are able to reproduce the empirical results will indicate a preference combination sufficient to reproduce our size dilemma conditions.
We created a public goods dilemma simulation in R according to the same specifications as
our empirical study. For each run of the simulation, agents were selected randomly from our
population. Based on the previously reported levels of freeriding behavior in social dilemmas
[32], we included free-riders—that is complete defectors—as one-third of the population. The
other two-thirds were mixed motive agents based on the integrative model. To ensure the simulations were stochastic, every agent on every round had a 10% chance of behaving randomly
(50% probability of cooperating).

Mathematical Specification of the Integrated Model Applied to Linear
Public Goods Dilemmas
The mixed motive agents behave randomly on the first round (50% probability of cooperating).
Thereafter, they use the utility function to calculate the utility of cooperating or defecting premised on all others making the same decisions as the previous round. Assuming others will
make the same choice as before seems to us to be the simplest model of others’ behavior. Based
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on others’ previous choice, the agent calculates the utility for the current round. If the utility
for cooperating exceed the utility for defecting the agent cooperates. Outcomes for Self is operationalized as one’s own points earned on one round according to Equation 1. Because all indicza
vidual outcomes on a given round are either cza
n for cooperation or n þ z for defection,
Equation 1 can be rewritten as one equation:
Outcomes for Self ¼

cza
þ ð1  cS Þz
n

ð3Þ

The difference in Outcomes for Self from switching from cooperation to defection, meaning
cS = 0 and therefore c decreases by 1, is always an increase by the Temptation to Defect, z  za
n.
Outcomes for Others is calculated as the average outcome all other players receive per round:
Outcomes for Others ¼

cza ðn  1  cO Þz
þ
n
n1

ð4Þ

In our empirical study and most public goods research with groups larger than 2, participants are
not aware of the contributions or cooperation levels of speciﬁc individuals. Instead they can see a
total level of cooperation and from this it is easy to calculate the points received by others, as evcza
eryone in the dilemma receives either cza
n for cooperation or n þ z for defection (Equation
1). While the average points others received from the dilemma can vary greatly, the utility difference for others between a participant’s choice to defect or cooperate is always za
n , which is the
MPCR x the endowment. Therefore, when switching from cooperation to defection—that is c decreases by 1, but CO does not change—Outcomes for Others decreases by za
n points (Equation 4).
Finally, Equality in Outcomes is calculated as the difference between one’s own outcome
and the average outcome of all other players (Equations 3 and 4). The negative absolute value
of this difference is added to the utility equation, so full equality in outcomes is 0, with negative
numbers representing more inequality:
cza
 cza ðn  1  c Þz 
O
þ ð1  cS Þz 
þ
Equality of Outcomes ¼ 
n
n
n1


n  1  cO
ð5Þ
¼  z 1  cS 
n1
When everyone cooperates, cS = 1; cO = n-1, or defects, cS = 0; cO = 0, Equality of Outcomes is 0,
but when the individual defects and the all others cooperate (or vice versa), cS = 0; cO = n-1,
Equality of Outcomes becomes the negative of the endowment-z (see S3 Fig. for a full example).
We want to note some interesting properties about these functions. The utility difference between cooperation and defection for both self and others outcomes does not change dynamically within the dilemma. The temptation to defect and the MPCR X the endowment will be
the same throughout a particular dilemma regardless of the decisions of any player in it. That
means that individuals relying only on these strategies should not deviate in their decisions
throughout the session. While this may trivialize simulation results based on only these two
functions, the model itself still has profound implications for the overall levels of cooperation.
For example, if outcomes to self and others are equally weighted, then the agents in the multiplier-constant five person conditions (those with MPCRs < .5) will choose full defection,
whereas the agents in the other four conditions will choose full cooperation. The response to
the parameters of the dilemma (Table 6) can be altered with a different integrative model
weighting scheme, but will not be affected by players’ round-to-round decisions.
Equality of Outcomes, however, can dynamically change over rounds within the dilemma
and can additionally create threshold points based on others behavior. As more players
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Table 6. Experimental conditions with values for outcome to self and others.
2-Person

Lower Beneﬁt

Higher Beneﬁt

5-Person
Multiplier Constant

MPCR Constant

Multiplier = 1.2

Multiplier = 1.2

Multiplier = 3.0

MPCR = .60

MPCR = .24

MPCR = .60

Self (Temptation to Defect): 40

Self (Temptation to Defect): 76

Self (Temptation to Defect): 40

Others: 60

Others: 24

Others: 60

Multiplier = 1.6

Multiplier = 1.6

Multiplier = 4.0

MPCR = .80

MPCR = .32

MPCR = .80

Self (Temptation to Defect): 20

Self (Temptation to Defect): 68

Self (Temptation to Defect): 20

Others: 80

Others: 32

Others: 80

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120379.t006

cooperate in a dilemma, the utility for the Equality of Outcomes is improved by additional cooperation and as more players defect, the utility of Equality of Outcomes is improved by additional defection. In this way, since one cannot alter the outcome of specific others, this equality
function simply suggests going along with the crowd in either defecting or cooperating. In fiveperson dilemmas this creates a threshold when two others cooperate and two others defect
(S3 Fig.) in which there is no equality advantage for selecting one option over the other.
Whereas the threshold points are stable within a dilemma’s specific parameters, combining it
with the self and other interest in the weighted utility function can create alternate threshold
points. For this we conduct simulations.

Simulation Results
We created 67 conditions by considering all weight combinations of W1 + W2 + W3 = 1 where

all W’s 2 {0,.1,.2,.3,.4,.5,. 6,.7,.8,.9,.1} plus a balanced weighting condition (all W 0 s ¼ :3 3)
allowing for us to examine a range of utility weight combinations. We conducted 500 public
good dilemma simulation trials for each of 402 conditions: 67 weight conditions  6 empirical
experimental conditions (Table 2). The results indicate that only one weight condition, W1 = .2,
W2 = .5, W3 = .3, reproduced the cooperation level pattern seen in the empirical results (Table 7).
The other weight conditions, including the more pure models (e.g., purely self-interested) do not
reproduce the empirical pattern (Table 7).
We conducted several variations of the simulations to ascertain the robustness of the model.
First, we simulated all conditions with a population of only mixed motive agents, that is we excluded the 1/3 defectors from the population. Second, we repeated the simulation of all conditions with a random normal distribution term (M = 0; SD = 50) added to the integrated utility
function allowing the utility of cooperation versus defection to be selected probabilistically.
Third, we simulated all conditions with a random normal distribution term (M = 0; SD = .1)
added to all three weights of each individual agent. In all three variations the W1 = .2, W2 = .5,
W3 = .3 weight combination continued to produce the closest pattern to the empirical results,
albeit with much higher cooperation levels in the no-defector simulation (S1 Table). Fourth,
we conducted simulations using the parameters from the best fit model (W1 = .2, W2 = .5,
W3 = .3) with agent memory adapted from Kashima, Woolcock, and Kashima [33]. The temporal utility function, UM, at time t is UM,t = (WM)(Ut) + (1-WM)(UM,t-1) where WM is the
weight of utility for the most recent outcome of the game. We varied WM from .1 to .9 in steps
of .1, and found that these varied only slightly and all replicated the pattern in the empirical
data with WM = .8 producing the closest match (S1 Table). Finally, we conducted 10 trials of a
genetic algorithm to optimize these different robustness parameters (S2 File), and found that
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Table 7. Simulation results compared with empirical results.
2-Person

5-Person
Multiplier Constant

MPCR Constant
W1

W2

W3

.061

1

0

0

.639

.630

0

1

0

.079

.090

0

0

1

.304

.616

.597

0

.5

.5

.061

.060

.638

.640

.5

.5

0

.059

.058

.083

.084

.5

0

.5

.268

.061

.085

.304

.601

.33

.33

.33

.616

.089

.308

.618

.644

.2

.5

.3

Low
Beneﬁt

High
Beneﬁt

Low
Beneﬁt

High
Beneﬁt

Low
Beneﬁt

High
Beneﬁt

.354

.629

.162

.237

.602

.611

Purely Self-Interested

.060

.059

.061

.060

.059

Purely Other-Interested

.640

.640

.631

.642

Purely Equality-Interested

.258

.259

.071

.078

Others & EqualityInterested

.247

.261

.335

Cooperative

.623

.633

Egalitarian

.259

.240

Balanced Weighting

.271

Best Fit Model

.248

Empirical
Results
Simulated
Results

Weights

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120379.t007

the two best solutions include (W1  .2, W2  .5, W3  .3) with low memory (WM) and *10
percent random behavior and (W1  .35, W2  .45, W3  .2) with no memory and *36 percent random behavior (Table B in S2 File). As the first of these is nearly identical to our previous best solution, this gives us further confidence in this parameter selection.
The initial simulations and the subsequent tests of robustness indicate to us the integrative
model without additional assumptions is sufficient to produce the results we observe empirically. Furthermore, the weighting scheme that produced the closest match to empirical results
suggests decision-making that accounts for both individual and group preferences, including
outcomes to self and others as well as equality of outcomes. Outcomes for Self received the
smallest weight of all three parameters; however, these weights may be only appropriate to with
regard to the parameters selected for these experimental conditions.

Further Explanation: Collective Response to Low Levels of Cooperation
One phenomenon present in the empirical data is a difference in how groups collectively respond to low levels of cooperation. Because cooperation is relatively more favorable for both
Outcomes to Self and Outcomes to Others as MPCR increases, groups with higher MPCR should
return to higher levels of cooperation after dropping to a lower level. Comparing all four 5-person group conditions, we observe patterns in which group with higher MPCRs reach lower levels of cooperation less often and when they do immediately return to higher levels of
cooperation, whereas groups with lower MPCRs always reach with low levels of cooperation
and rarely increase it afterwards. To examine this response pattern we counted all 5-person
groups which had at least one round where the number of contributors was 0 or 1. The first of
these rounds that occur we refer to as the drop point round, as it must either be a drop from a
higher level of contribution unless it is the first round of interaction. For cases that have the
drop point round, the next round is a chance to rebound. On this round we find that in the
groups with MPCRs of .24 and .34 have average contributions by less than one person, .71 and
.75 people, respectively, indicating a failure to rebound. In contrast, the groups with MPCRs of
.60 and .80 obtain an average of 1.67 and 2.33 people contributing, respectively, indicating a rebound from the drop point. We selected the drop point of 0 or only 1 player cooperating because it represents—for at least that round—a clear dominance of self-interest. Yet if multiple
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Table 8. Drop point and rebound roundsa effects for groups in the empirical and simulated data.
5-Person
Multiplier Constant
Low Beneﬁt
Empirical Data
Simulated Data

a

High Beneﬁt

MPCR Constant
Low Beneﬁt

High Beneﬁt

Percentage that reached a drop point round

100 (17/17)

100 (16/16)

56.3 (9/16)

60.0 (9/15)

Average number of rebound round contributors

.71

.75

1.67

2.33

Percentage that reached a drop point round

98.2 (491/500)

71.2 (356/500)

49.00 (245/500)

51.80 (259/500)

Average number of rebound round contributors

.25

.24

1.50

2.77

A drop point round is the ﬁrst round with 0 or 1 cooperators; the rebound round is the next one.

doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0120379.t008

people contribute in the following round it indicates both collective rationality—that people
are behaving motivated by group preferences—as well as collective action, that people while individually making choices produce a group-level result.
We compare this empirical trend to our simulated data from the best fit model (Table 8).
The proportion that contains a drop-point round across all conditions is lower for the simulated data than for the empirical data. Also compared to the empirical data, the simulated data indicated even fewer contributors in a rebound round for the low MPCR conditions (around .25)
while a similar number of contributors for the high MPCR conditions. Most importantly, it accurately predicts whether there will be a rebound or not after the drop-points in terms of
whether the number of contributors exceeds 1. Whereas this is not proof of a mechanism, it
does suggest how a model of individual and group preferences in addition to reproducing levels
in overall cooperation levels can also reproduce collective action.

General Discussion
This paper has two major contributions. First, we clarified the size dilemma in public goods research: that the size of the group sometimes increases, sometimes decreases, and sometimes
does not affect cooperation levels. We took a three-pronged approach to addressing this issue.
(1) We classified the properties used in public goods dilemmas as individual (MPCR, Temptation to Defect) and group (Multiplier, Earnings for full cooperation) properties, showing the
relationship of those property types to group size and cooperation levels. (2) We connected
those properties to individual and group preferences and ultimately to Van Lange’s integrated
model of social value orientations both through hypothesis testing and simulations. (3) We experimentally tested and compared both holding individual and holding group properties constant while size varies. This one experiment with a limited number of conditions and groups
resulting in several results close to the traditional significance cut off of .05 should be verified
by similar future studies. However, our confidence in the results is bolstered given the grouplevel analyses, individual-level analyses, and simulations converged in line with the theoretical
hypotheses and prior literature.
Consistent with our predictions and the previous literature, holding group properties constant decreased cooperation with size, whereas holding individual properties constant did not
affect cooperation for public goods dilemmas with a higher level of benefit. For a lower level of
benefit and constant individual properties, size increased cooperation which is in line with our
counterintuitive hypothesis about equality concerns leading to polarization in smaller groups.
Alternatively, this could be interpreted as a ceiling effect, where lower benefit groups increased
cooperation with size when individual properties were held constant, but higher benefit groups
did hit a cooperation ceiling, potentially caused by a percentage of defectors in the population
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[32]. Both explanations are reasonable given this data, but the former is theoretically derived
from the integrative model of social orientations.
Our second major contribution was applying an explanation of individual decision making
to public goods dilemmas based on current research in collective rationality or team-based reasoning, which is reasoning about group preferences in addition to individual preferences. We
implemented this theoretical perspective in terms of Van Lange’s integrative model where individuals attend to and are motivated by a combination of self-interest, interest for others, and
equality for all. Van Lange has shown that this model appropriately represents the behaviors
and expectations of prosocial individuals [22] and is a sufficient explanation for collective rationality [14]. Applying this model to public goods dilemmas of different sizes, we find that the
inclusion of an equality term leads to novel predictions as well as dynamic decision making.
Not only are predictions based on this model consistent with our results, but the agent-based
simulation further confirms that the outcomes and processes from the model to the data are
coherent. Using agent based modeling rooted in a theoretical basis and with an empirical
benchmark can enhance our understanding of an issue [34], in this case connecting people’s
motivations with their individual and collective action, and interactions, within public
goods dilemmas.
In regards to continuing work in the area of public goods dilemmas we hope our parameterization will sensitize other researchers to the interrelation between size, properties, and cooperation levels. Our finding of an interaction effect between the change in size and benefit level
indicate to some degree that changing the size of a public goods dilemma alters it in fundamental ways instead of always having a simple orthogonal effect. Furthermore, our study shows
how the size-based individual and group properties alter cooperation for the particular parameterization we chose. Future research should consider different formulations of the public
goods dilemma, such as step-function, one-shot, partial contribution dilemmas, and groups
larger than five. Groups of two and five, while substantively different from each other, are relatively small and therefore the explanations we proposed are limited in that they may not scale
to larger groups including the largest groups, such as societies. Research has shown that large
groups have a pronounced effect on cooperation, but above a certain point there are few effects
of further increases in size on cooperation [4, 5, 20, 26, 31].
Whereas we presented individual’s motivation vis-à-vis individual and group preferences as
a sufficient explanation, it is neither exclusive nor complete. We hope this research will spawn
comparisons of competing and complementary explanations. Does collective rationality better
explain differences in social dilemmas, especially enigmas in social dilemmas such as the size
problem, than explanations based on affective, learning, efficacy, or normative processes? Collective rationality, focused on motivation for decision making, could also be combined with
other explanations that detail the mechanisms within one’s decision-making process. A limitation of this study was that we did not measure individual-level properties such as social value
orientations [18, 33] or intentions to cooperate. This data would be fundamental to tease apart
the individual decision making process in social dilemma settings, and to explore the presence
and ordering of potential structural, cognitive, affective and behavioral mechanisms.
The extant literature indicates several possible mechanisms that could function separately
or in tandem with collective rationality. In step-level dilemmas, self-efficacy and collective-efficacy decrease with group size as people feel like their contribution matters less and therefore it
justifies their uncooperative actions [7, 35], however it unclear if this would generalize to linear
public goods dilemmas [21]. Against the rationality of self-interested behavior, social norms
develop in situations of collective action [36] which then can facilitate collective behavior
through cohesion or sanctioning [37, 38]. Either self-efficacy or social norms could function as
a mechanism by which individual and group preferences are enacted, or serve as alternative
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explanations to preferences based on social value orientations. For example, do individuals
who feel empowered focus more on collective outcomes or do collective preferences lead to behavior which enhances self-efficacy? Or does size trigger a lower level of self-efficacy [7], which
then changes individual and collective preferences irrespective of the other dilemma properties? We leave it up to future research to see how these and other internal mechanisms might
interplay with individual and collective preferences.
Our simulated results spotlight additional research questions. For instance, how do social
value orientations differently operate in situations with multiple others? Is prosociality directed
toward multiple others individually, to the group as a whole, or is it conditioned on the separability of other’s contributions? We implemented our agent-based model with all other players
as a single collective, thereby not increasing the weight of the prosocial terms for additional
players. However, one could imagine a pure altruist being more interested in helping the most
people, as opposed to helping one individual most. As size within public goods dilemmas is differently structured according to group and individual parameters, size within collective rationality could be applied with different formulations.
A related limitation of our study involves our smallest group containing two people only,
whereby the collective outside of oneself is only one other person. To fully understand the implications of collective rationality in multiple actor dilemmas it is necessary to recognize how
joint outcomes or equality are interpreted for a “collective” of one other person versus a group
collective in which the individual members are less separable [39]. Georg Simmel perhaps was
the first to suggest the fundamental difference between a dyad, where groupness is fully dependent on each person, and a triad, where the group can exist without any other single individual.
Similarly, as others have noted [19], a social dilemma of two people compared to those with
more than two people can lead to different outcomes. Both the Outcome for Others and the
Equality of Outcomes depend on others, meaning when the total group is greater than two people, these others’ properties are combinations of multiple people’s behaviors, not just a single
individual’s behavior. Future research should consider this in more detail.
In conclusion, this research highlights important issues of theoretical and practical concern.
Theoretically, the application of social value orientations into game theoretic dilemmas is not
novel, but integration of collectively oriented social values through team-based reasoning introduces a rationality that is not only interesting, but contributes to extant issues. One such
issue is the dilemma of dilemmas that is the dilemma of the divergent specifications and findings regarding size and public goods dilemmas. Our specification and findings have illuminated this issue and hopefully will encourage researchers across disciplines to carefully specify
public goods dilemmas in light of both individual and group properties. Practical applications
from this line of research abound as a fundamental difference between the sizes of many realworld public goods dilemmas. An implication for the largest dilemmas, such as the preservation of the natural environment, includes not only focusing on the personal benefits which are
often minimal, but also others’ benefits and the equality of them. An integrated focus on all
these concepts may be more effective than focusing on one concept to the neglect of the others.
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S1 Data. Supporting data.
(SAV)
S1 Fig. Marginal Per Capita Return by different sizes of public goods dilemma and different multipliers (α). Because multipliers are constrained from 1 < α < n, we have shown four
values to cover the range of α when n = 2.
(PDF)
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S2 Fig. Multiplier values by different sizes of public goods dilemma and different Marginal
Per Capita Return values. MPCR values are always between 0 and 1, but for a 2-person public
goods dilemma, the MPCR must remain about .5, so we have shown four values to cover the
range of .5 to 1.
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S3 Fig. Equality of Outcomes equation, jz 1  cS  n1
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